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What are the positive and normative implications of eliminating bankruptcy protection for
indebted individuals? Without bankruptcy protection, creditors can collect on defaulted debt to
the extent permitted by wage garnishment laws. The elimination lowers the default premium on
unsecured debt and permits low-net-worth individuals suering bad earnings shocks to smooth
consumption by borrowing. There is a large increase in consumer debt nanced essentially
by super-wealthy individuals, a modest drop in capital per worker, and a higher frequency of
consumer default. Average welfare rises by 1 percent of consumption in perpetuity, with about
90 percent of households favoring the change.
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1 Introduction
Unlike most other industrialized countries, default on consumer debt is a very common occurrence
in the United States. Fundamentally, this feature of the US consumer credit market derives from
the institution of personal bankruptcy: An indebted individual has the legal right to petition a
bankruptcy court to have his or her nancial obligations discharged, following which creditors must
Corresponding Author: Satyajit Chatterjee, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 10
Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 215-574-3861. Email: satyajit.chatterjee@phil.frb.org. The authors
would like to thank Robert King and two anonymous referees for very useful comments on earlier versions of this
paper. Comments provided by Burcu Eyigungor, Robert Hunt, Leo Martinez, Makoto Nakajima, and Per Krusell
are very gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
re
ect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. This paper is available free
of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/.
1cease all eorts to collect on the debt. The option to declare bankruptcy limits how vigorously
creditors can pursue delinquent debtors and, knowing this, debtors choose to default on their debt
more readily. Since the start of the crisis-induced downturn in September 2008, the outstanding
stock of revolving consumer debt has declined by more than 15 percent. It declined, in part, because
debtors stopped making payments on their obligations and, as required by regulation and law, the
defaulted debt was charged o and removed from the balance sheets of creditor banks.
Given this recent experience, it is tempting to ask whether policies designed to discourage
consumer bankruptcy are desirable. The answer is not obvious. On the one hand, discourag-
ing bankruptcy makes it harder for over-extended households to escape the consequences of bad
luck. On the other hand, by making default less likely it makes credit cheaper and permits better
consumption-smoothing. Exactly how much cheaper, though, depends on the constraints imposed
on creditors by garnishment laws. These laws allow households some measure of protection against
creditors and serve somewhat the same function as the \safety valve" of personal bankruptcy. The
goal of this paper is to answer the following specic question using quantitative theoretic methods:
What are the positive and normative implications of eliminating the personal bankruptcy option
and letting current garnishment laws be the sole operative law dealing with consumer default?
The implications of eliminating the bankruptcy option, or discharge, have been studied by previ-
ous authors in a quantitative setting. However, these studies uniformly equate the \no-bankruptcy"
world to an environment with an innite cost of defaulting on consumer debt.1 This is problematic
for two reasons. First, there is ample historical evidence to suggest that there will be default on
consumer debt even in the absence of bankruptcy protection. Indeed, it was the plight of delin-
quent debtors caught in the grip of unrelenting creditors that provided the impetus and motivation
for discharge.2 Second, the assumption has unpalatable consequences for the theory: It implies
that the consumer can borrow, at the risk-free rate, as much as the present discounted value of
the stream of the lowest earnings realization possible. Even for very low earnings realizations this
bound (the so-called \natural borrowing limit") can be quite large relative to average income. Un-
restricted ability to borrow such large sums at the risk-free rate is patently unrealistic and distorts
the assessment of the welfare gain from eliminating bankruptcy protection.
In contrast, the\no-bankruptcy" world in this paper features a realistic alternative to the
bankruptcy option, one that is based on garnishment laws actually in existence. The elimina-
tion of bankruptcy protection does not eliminate consumer default { individuals in dire straits can
default and repay their debt gradually over time by subjecting themselves to wage garnishment.
The possibility of default, and subsequent slow repayment on defaulted debt, makes consumer loans
expensive even in the absence of bankruptcy protection. Thus the approach taken in this paper
features a more plausible counterfactual loan supply schedule and is consistent with the historical
1Examples are Athreya (2002, 2008), Li and Sarte (2006), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and R os-Rull (2007)
and Athreya, Tam and Young (2009).
2See, for instance, the discussion in Coleman (1999) and Warren (1935).
2experience of consumer default during the pre-discharge era.
Elimination of bankruptcy protection results in only moderate changes in factor prices and a 1
percent increase in average welfare. However, it results in a two orders of magnitude increase in
unsecured debt. This large increase in debt results from the fact that the added commitment to
honor debt contracts lowers interest rates and encourages low-net-worth individuals suering bad
earnings shocks to borrow more in order to smooth consumption. The additional borrowing results
in a small rise in the risk-free interest rate { and a correspondingly small decline in real wages {
because the very wealthy have a high interest elasticity of savings. Since low-net-worth individuals
borrow from high-net-worth individuals, the expansion in debt results in a correspondingly large
increase in wealth inequality. The large increase in debt is accompanied by an increase in the
frequency of consumer default. Despite lower wages and higher default rates, the majority of
individuals prefer the \no-bankruptcy" world: the wealthy benet from the higher risk-free interest
rate and the poor from a decrease in borrowing costs.
Although delinquent debtors are permitted to lower their labor supply in response to the \gar-
nishment tax," this channel is essentially inoperative in our model. There are two reasons for
this: First, the elasticity of labor supply is chosen to produce a factor of 2 dierence in the hours
worked between high and low eciency workers. Since these workers earn very dierent wages, the
implied labor supply elasticity { consistent with microeconomic studies { is quite low.3 Second,
when people go into garnishment they often earn less than the threshold above which garnishment
is operative, so their labor supply choice is not distorted. Thus, the ndings reported in this paper
do not support the notion that bankruptcy provides superior labor supply incentives.4
The prediction that elimination of bankruptcy protection will result in a large increase in con-
sumer debt (and the associated large increase in wealth inequality) seems at variance with the
experience of continental European countries. These countries, which historically have not permit-
ted discharge of debt, do not display the high wealth inequality predicted by our garnishment-only
(i.e., \no-bankruptcy") model. On the other hand, European countries display much less idiosyn-
cratic earnings risk than the US, which could also account for their less extreme wealth distributions.
Taking Sweden (which did not permit discharge until 2005) as a test case, we show that when we
simulate our garnishment-only US model with the Swedish earnings process, the model generates
a wealth distribution that is close to Sweden's actual wealth distribution. Thus less risky earnings
processes may explain why these countries do not display the extreme wealth distribution predicted
by our model despite having not permitted discharge historically.
A policy change as dramatic as elimination of bankruptcy protection compels a re-thinking of
garnishment law as well. With this in mind, the paper also investigates the optimal garnishment
regime in the absence of discharge. It nds that welfare is higher if elimination of discharge is
3Increasing the dierence in hours worked to a factor of 4 leads to essentially the same results.
4This nding is in line with the results reported in Li and Han (2007). Chen (2010) argues that the labor supply
eect of bankruptcy is positive but small because of o-setting wealth and substitution eects.
3also accompanied by less liberal (from the viewpoint of debtors) garnishment laws. How much less
depends on the details of the earnings process: The possibility of a low probability \disaster state"
(in which earnings are very low) pushes policy in the direction of a more liberal garnishment law.
Still, results suggest that current garnishment laws are too liberal: Welfare would be higher if less
income is protected from garnishment.
Among existing quantitative studies, two come closest to the spirit of this study. The rst is
Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt's (2007) comparison of the discharge option (or \Fresh Start") with
something akin to garnishment (which they label the \European System").5 But there are some
important dierences between their study and this one. First, our goal is to compare a regime in
which both bankruptcy and garnishment are active in equilibrium (as it is in reality) with a regime
in which only garnishment can be active. Second, we model the production side of the economy,
whereas Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt work with an endowment economy. The rst dierence is
important because the co-existence of bankruptcy and garnishment bounds the costs of garnishment
(these costs must be much lower than those for bankruptcy; otherwise, individuals will always opt
to discharge their debts) which, in turn, has consequences for the deadweight costs of default in the
garnishment-only economy. The second dierence is important because strong general equilibrium
eects can potentially emerge from elimination of bankruptcy protection.6
Second is Li and Sarte (2006), who examine the welfare eects of means-testing for obtaining a
discharge (so-called Chapter 7 ling), when the alternative to discharge is partial debt repayment
(so-called Chapter 13 ling).7 If the qualications for a discharge are made so stringent as to leave
Chapter 13 as the only default option, the institutional arrangement may seem to resemble one
in which defaulters can either repay their debts or subject themselves to \garnishment." But this
resemblance is more apparent than real. In practice (as well in the theory presented in Li and Sarte,
2006), a Chapter 13 ling will involve substantial forgiveness of debt. Thus, permitting Chapter
13 lings only is not the same as eliminating discharge altogether. Li and Sarte do consider the
case where bankruptcy protection is eliminated completely (so neither Chapter 7 or 13 lings are
permitted) but they do not consider the possibility that debtors may still default and repay their
debts gradually in accordance with the debtor protection oered under garnishment laws.
There is also an important substantive dierence in the environment analyzed in this paper and
the one in Li and Sarte (2006). The latter assume that people borrow (subject to an exogenously
5In their \European System," an individual cannot discharge his debt, so default leads to some portion of his
future wage earnings being taken in satisfaction of the creditors' claim. In the working paper version of the paper,
Livshits, McGee, and Tertilt (2003), the authors also considered the case where the garnishment process allowed
households to work less and featured a constant exemption level.
6This point was stressed in Li and Sarte (2006), who showed that taking into account general equilibrium eects
can overturn welfare results obtained in partial equilibrium settings.
7\Chapter choice" is a decision about protecting current assets versus future earnings. In a Chapter 7 ling, the
individual relinquishes all his non-exempt assets but in return gets to keep his future wage earnings; in a Chapter 13
ling, the individual gets to keep his non-exempt assets but agrees to repay his outstanding debts over time but only
up to the value of the non-exempt assets that would have been relinquished under a Chapter 7 ling.
4given borrowing limit) at an undierentiated interest rate that fetches zero prots when returns
are averaged across all borrowers. Since the interest rate charged on loans is independent of
the size of the loan, large borrowers (who are worse risks) are subsidized by small borrowers.8
In contrast, the approach followed in this paper eschews any form of cross-subsidization across
borrowers: Every loan makes zero prots, in expectation. Since default risk varies with individual
characteristics (in particular, earnings) as well as the amount borrowed, individuals borrow at
dierentiated interest rates. This is consistent with the evidence: For the US, Edelberg (2006)
has shown that interest rates on unsecured consumer credit vary positively with perceived default
risk - i.e., pricing of consumer loans is risk-based.9 Because bigger loans require higher interest
rates, how much individuals can borrow to smooth consumption is limited. Consequently, the
elimination of discharge { and the resulting shift out in individual loan supply schedules { has a
more dramatic eect on an individual's capacity to borrow. This expansion in credit, combined
with the riskiness of the US earnings process, underlies both the predicted welfare gain as well as
the predicted increase in wealth inequality.10
In related work, Athreya (2008) presents a careful study of the implications of eliminating
bankruptcy protection in a partial equilibrium life-cycle setting with earnings risk. Elimination is
taken to mean that default becomes innitely costly, which, in turn, means that the maximum level
of borrowing that can be supported in the no-bankruptcy equilibrium is determined by the natural
borrowing limit. This introduces a tight link between \default policy" and \social insurance provi-
sion," which the paper explores. In Athreya, Tam and Young (2009), the focus is on understanding
(again, in a partial equilibrium context) the merits of harsh default penalties (in eect, making the
cost of default innite) versus keeping penalties low but providing loan guarantees to lenders so as
to lower the price of credit to households.
8Conceptually, this formulation is problematic for the following reason: A lender can come in to serve small
borrowers at a slightly lower interest rate and make positive prots. Thus, this formulation implicitly assumes
restriction on entry.
9In practice, the interest rate paid by a borrower is negatively related to the individual's credit score { which is
an index of the probability of repayment of a loan. Credit scores are lower for observably higher risk individuals and
they tend to fall with increased borrowing. Thus higher risk individuals pay higher interest rates and interest rates
paid tend to rise with the amount of outstanding debt. Chatterjee, Corbae and R os-Rull (2011) provide more details
on the relationship between repayment behavior, borrowing and the evolution of credit scores.
10In the case where Li and Sarte (2006) allow only Chapter 13 lings, the increase in the debt-to-income ratio is
about 4 percent and the increase in steady state welfare -1 percent (Table 4, p. 628). It is worth noting that their
calibration is dierent in 3 important respects. First, their debt-to-income ratio is 6 percent, much higher than the
0.09 percent used in this study. In this paper, only negative net-worth individuals are viewed as borrowing unsecured
so the debt-to-income ratio is much lower. Second, the eciency process used in Li and Sarte has an unconditional
standard deviation of 0.56, while the process used in this paper has an unconditional standard deviation of 7.92 (mean
of both processes is 1). Third, Li and Sarte allow for proportional transactions costs on loans, while transactions
costs are ignored in this study.
52 The Model Economy
This section discusses the model economy. For a more extensive model description, the reader is
referred to the appendix.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
At any given time, there is a unit mass of people in the economy. Each person has a probability
of survival given by  2 (0;1) so that a fraction 1    of the population dies each period and is
replaced by newborns.
Each person has a unit of time endowment. People dier in terms of the productive eciency
of their time endowment, which varies stochastically over time. These eciencies are denoted by
e. In any period, an individual's e is drawn from a discrete probability distribution with compact
support E  R++ and probability mass function s(e).11 Here, s is a nite-state Markov chain
taking values in a set S with transition probabilities s;s0. Draws from this process, as well as
from s(e), are independent across people. Thus, the eciency process has a persistent component
controlled by s and a transitory component controlled by s. A person's anticipated lifetime utility
from a sequence fct;nt;etg of consumption, eort and eciency levels is given by
X1
t=0()tu(ct;nt;et) (1)
where  is the discount factor,  is the probability of survival and the momentary utility function
u(c;n;e) : [0;1)  [0;1]  E ! R is strictly increasing and concave in c, strictly decreasing and
convex in n, and dierentiable in the rst two arguments. For technical reasons, the eciency level
is allowed to aect period utility.
There is an aggregate production function F(K;N) : R+  R+ ! R+, which gives the total
quantity of the single good produced in this economy as a function of the aggregate capital stock K
and aggregate eciency units of labor N. We assume that F is CRS, dierentiable, increasing and
displays diminishing marginal products with respect to each input. The capital stock depreciates
at the rate  2 (0;1).
2.2 Market Arrangement
In each period, there is a market for eciency units of labor where people and the representative
rm in charge of the (aggregate) production technology transact in labor services: people can sell
11In Chatterjee et al. (2007), these probability distributions were assumed to be continuous, not discrete (continuous
e is necessary to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium). Provided the number of grid points on e is large,
reasonably accurate solutions to equilibrium prices can be found. See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2010) for discussion
of the computational challenges involved in computing debt/default models of this type and their Appendix B for a
comparison of the numerical accuracy of the solution when e is taken to be discrete vs continuous.
6any portion of their eciency endowments to the rm at the wage wt per eciency unit, where the
wage is expressed in terms of the period-t consumption good.
There is a market for the services of physical capital. The representative rm can rent physical
capital from an intermediary sector at the rate of rt units of consumption good per unit of capital.
Most crucially, there is a market in which people can borrow and lend. When a person borrows,
the option to default implies that the interest rate at which he borrows will depend on his likelihood
of default. The latter, in turn, will depend on all observable factors that potentially in
uence that
likelihood. In the context of this model, these factors are (i) the size of the liability (or promise), (ii)
the person's current eciency status and (iii) all current and future factor prices. It is notationally
convenient to denote assets by positive numbers and liabilities by negative numbers. We use p
to denote the sequence of current and future factor prices fwj;rjg
j=1
j=0 . Then, the unit price of a
promise to deliver y (if y < 0) units of the consumption good next period by a person with current
persistent state s is q(y;s;p) > 0.12 By making this promise, the person receives q(y;s;p)( y)
units of the consumption good in the current period. If y  0, the person obtains a promise to
receive y next period and gives up  q(p)y in the current period. Thus, people borrow at interest
rates that vary with the loan size but lend at an interest rate that is independent of the amount
lent and the person's eciency level. These prices depend on the current and future trajectory of
factor prices because our analysis allows for transition dynamics. In addition to the market for new
loans and deposits, there is also a market where intermediaries may trade debt that is in default.
The market price of an unpaid obligation of the amount y < 0 belonging to an individual with
current persistent eciency level s is denoted x(y;s;p).
It is assumed that the intermediary sector is the counterparty in all intertemporal trades entered
into by people. One implication of this assumption is that if a person dies, his assets or liabilities
are absorbed by the intermediary sector.
2.3 Garnishment, Bankruptcy, Collecting and Reporting Laws
A brief description of US wage garnishment laws is now provided. If a debtor fails to repay a debt,
creditors have the legal right to seize the debtor's property and earnings in satisfaction of their
claims. The purpose of wage garnishment laws is to provide some measure of debtor protection
against creditor rights. Federal law stipulates that 75 percent of a debtor's disposable earnings
are outside the reach of creditors, with many states choosing to protect even more.13 To garnish
a person's wages, a creditor must obtain a court order and this order is granted for a limited
time only. Upon expiration of the order, a new order must be obtained if the garnishment is
to continue. Because garnishment is costly, creditors have a strong incentive to pass these costs
12The price depends only on the persistent component of eciency because this is the component that helps predict
the future eciency level e
0 and persistent state s
0. In particular, current e does not aect the price because it is a
purely transitory draw that does not predict future earnings.
13See Lefgren and McIntyre (2009), Table 2.
7on to the debtor. Federal law (the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) stipulates that creditors
cannot add additional charges (such as fees and interest charges) to the original obligation unless
such additions are permitted explicitly by the contract or by the state (if the contract is silent on
it). State practice varies quite a bit in this regard, with some states permitting additional fees
and interest charges on the unpaid debt. However, courts generally take a dim view of creditors'
attempts to recover more than reasonable collection costs through this channel. Lastly, a federal
statute of limitations on unpaid debt exists: if a debt has not been paid in over 10 years, the
creditor loses the right to garnish wages (or seize property) in satisfaction of the claim.
This institutional setup is mapped into our model in the following way. First, it is assumed that
no additional fees or interest charges can be assessed on unpaid debt. Second, there is assumed to be
no statute of limitations on unpaid debt and no transactions costs of enforcing wage garnishment.
Consequently, if a delinquent debtor chooses not to le for bankruptcy, garnishment continues for as
long as there is any unpaid obligation. Third, as long as there is any unpaid obligation, the debtor
cannot accumulate assets and must pay some legally determined fraction of disposable income to the
creditor. In the model, the garnishment formula is modeled as the assumption that the delinquent
debtor must pay at least minfmaxf0;
(wen   cmin)g; ag toward reducing his obligation, where

 is the fraction of disposable income that can be garnished, wen is current period earnings,  a
is the size of the unpaid obligation in the current period, and cmin is \reasonable living expenses"
as determined by law. Importantly, the choice of n is left to the delinquent debtor and there is
no compulsion to earn above cmin. Lastly, it is assumed that delinquency and garnishment have
pecuniary costs to the debtor, which are modeled as a consumption loss of proportion g of earnings.
These costs are paid every period the debtor is under garnishment and, once the garnishment ends,
for as long as lenders know that the person was garnished sometime in the past (more on this
below).
Turning attention to the modeling of bankruptcy, the following assumptions are made. First, a
debtor has the right to have his unpaid obligations discharged. Second, there are no transactions
costs of ling for bankruptcy. Third, a debtor ling for bankruptcy must forfeit all his assets to
satisfaction of the claim. Fourth, the process of obtaining discharge consumes the entire period so
that in the period of bankruptcy, the debtor can neither accumulate assets nor borrow. Lastly, it
is assumed that bankruptcy imposes pecuniary costs that result in a loss of consumption equal to
a proportion b of earnings and that these are paid for as long as lenders know a person declared
bankruptcy in the past.
In addition to garnishment and bankruptcy laws, the Fair Credit Reporting Act stipulates how
long negative information, such as late payments, bankruptcies, garnishments, and tax liens, may
stay on a person's credit report. By law, bankruptcy information can stay on a credit report for
ten years. Garnishments can stay on the report for twelve years from the date of entry or for seven
years from the date they were satised. This aspect of US law is relevant for our study because
8negative information in a person's credit report appears to impair the person's access to credit.14
In the model, the following assumptions are made regarding the consequence and duration
of negative credit information. First, a person with a record of a past bankruptcy or a past
garnishment cannot borrow. Second, the record of a past bankruptcy is removed from a person's
credit history with probability b. Third, a record of garnishment always appears as long as the
individual is under garnishment. Fourth, if a person under garnishment les for bankruptcy, his
record of garnishment is replaced by a record of bankruptcy. Finally, a record of past garnishment
is removed with probability g:
2.4 Equilibrium
The preceding environment maps into decision problems for individuals in the following way. Sur-
viving individuals enter into a period with either assets or debt and with either a clean credit record
or an impaired one. A credit record is impaired if it has either a bankruptcy or garnishment \
ag,"
i.e., a record of past bankruptcy or garnishment that has not been removed. An individual with
debt and a clean credit record gets to decide if he wants to default on the debt and, conditional on
defaulting, whether to le for bankruptcy or subject himself to wage garnishment. If the person
chooses not to default, he decides how much to borrow or save in the current period. An individual
with debt and a garnishment 
ag gets to choose whether to continue on in garnishment or to declare
bankruptcy. If the person declares bankruptcy, then he cannot borrow or save in the current period
and his garnishment 
ag is turned into a bankruptcy 
ag; if he continues on in garnishment, he
cannot borrow but he can accumulate assets if he pays o all his unpaid obligations. An individual
who enters the period without debt does not have a default decision to make. If his credit record
is clean, he chooses how much to borrow or save; if his credit record is impaired, he cannot borrow
but he can save. All individuals, no matter what their circumstances, get to choose how hard to
work.
The (representative) competitive intermediary's decision problem is static: it simply decides
how much of each type of loan to make at the going price of each type of loan. By the law of large
numbers, the intermediary's aggregate return on its loan portfolio is constant. Thus, it operates
like a risk-neutral lender with respect to each individual loan. In equilibrium, the price of any
individual loan adjusts to generate exactly zero net return. Thus, the intermediary is indierent
about making any particular loan: it simply writes loans that consumers want. A loan that defaults
into bankruptcy pays nothing; a loan that defaults into garnishment may pay something and, in
addition, becomes a defaulted debt that can be traded in the market at some price. If there is no
default on the loan, the loan pays back what was promised.
14Musto (2004) provides compelling evidence in favor of this assumption. See Chatterjee, Corbae and R os-Rull
(2011) for the theoretical foundation for this nding.
93 Calibration
This section discusses the calibration of the model economy.
3.1 Functional Forms
For u() it is assumed that







; with  > 0; > 0; > 0: (2)
Thus, we adopt the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Human (1988) specication for preferences, mod-
ied slightly as in Mehlkopf (2010), to allow for a state dependent constant term A(e). There are
two advantages to this specication. First, the level of consumption c does not aect the MRS
between consumption and eort, which is simply given by n. Second, for any feasible c, the
requirement that c   n1+=(1 + ) + A(e)  0 { which is needed for current utility to be well-
dened { can be eectively reduced to the requirement that c  0 by an appropriate choice of
A(e). By the rst property, the unconstrained choice of n for a person in good standing is given by
 n(e;p) = (ew(p)=)1=. In what follows, we set A(e) to be equal to ( n(e;  p))1+=(1 + ) where  p
denotes the sequence of (constant) factor prices associated with the targeted capital output ratio.
In the steady state, where w is constant over time, this term will vary with e only and will generally
oset the  (n(a;e;h;s;p))1+=(1+) term. Thus, the requirement that c n1+=(1+)+A(e)  0
will eectively become the requirement that c  0. Furthermore, when the oset is operative, utility
is simply given by c1 =(1   ).
It is assumed that for the vast majority of the population, the eciency level e follows the
process
ln(et) = ! + zt + t with zt =  zt 1 + "t;  2 (0;1);t  1 (3)
where ! is drawn at birth from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2
!, t and "t
are drawn from Normal distributions with mean 0 and variance 2
 and 2
", and z0 is drawn from
the invariant distribution of the AR1 process. Thus the eciency process (and consequently the
earnings process) has three components: a permanent component that is determined at the time
the person enters the economy, a persistent component that follows an AR1 process and a purely
transitory component. However, it is assumed that any individual, regardless of his or her !;zt;
and t, can draw an extremely high (relative to mean) eciency level, denoted Emax, with a (small)
probability 0: From this \super-rich" state, he returns with probability 1 to an eciency level
drawn according to the invariant distribution of !;zt; and t. This super-rich state is added to
generate the highly skewed wealth inequality seen in the US. The combined eciency process can be
mapped back to the model's eciency process via a suitable choice of the set S and the distributions
10s:
Lastly, it is assumed that the aggregate production function is given by KN1 .
3.2 Data Targets and Parameter Values
With these functional forms, aside from A(e), there are twenty parameter values to x. These are
four preference parameters (; ; ; ); one demographic parameter (); four technology param-
eters (;;g;b); four legal system parameters (g;b;cmin;








"; ) are chosen to match the wage process estimates in Floden and Linde
(2001) for the US. Wages as measured in Floden and Linde correspond to w(p)e in our model.
Thus, in the steady state, their estimated wage process can be used to calibrate the eciency
process and this xes (2
!;2
;2
"; ) to (0:1175;0:0421;0:0426;0:9136). The parameters 0 and 1
are taken from Chatterjee et al. (Table III, p. 1550), who also incorporate this state to generate the
observed US wealth inequality. This xes (0;1)=(0:0001;0:020).15 The mean of the augmented
eciency process is normalized to 1, with Emax equal to 731:7. The value of Emax was set to
essentially match the capital output ratio.16 By way of comparison, if mean household income of
$60;000 is equated to the mean earnings in the model, Emax results in income of $71 million.
The capital share of income  is set to 0.36 and the depreciation rate of capital  is set to
0.10, values that are standard in quantitative studies. The value of  was set to .975 so that the
expected lifetime is 40 years. The value of  was set to 2. The value of  was constrained by
requiring that the highest paid person work twice as long as the lowest paid person. Using the
expression for unconstrained labor choice, this restriction requires that [Emax=Emin] = 2 where
Emin is the lowest value of the discretized eciency process. This xes  to 11.8, which implies a
labor supply elasticity of 0:09; consistent with the generally low values of elasticities found in micro
studies.17
The garnishment rate 
 was chosen to be 0:25, which is the federal limit.18 IRS Financial
Collection Standards for allowable living expenses were used to estimate the \reasonable cost of
living," cmin: This took into account the allowable costs of housing, utilities, food, personal care
and services, and miscellaneous expenses for households of dierent sizes. The distribution of
15Note 0 is calculated from Chatterjee et al.'s parameters as the probability of moving to the super-rich state
conditional on being either white-collar or blue-collar.
16Although the capital output ratio is aected by other parameters, Emax largely controls the amount of wealth
held by the super-rich and thus has a disproportionately strong eect on the capital output ratio.
17Domeij and Floden (2006) have noted that borrowing constraints could downwardly bias the estimate of labor
supply elasticity for certain specications of utility functions. Our GHH specication does not suer from this bias
because labor supply is independent of consumption and therefore wealth.
18Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) (Table 2, pp. 376-77) report that 23 US states adhere to the federal guideline on
the fraction of disposable income that must be protected from garnishment (75 percent). Of the remaining states, 15
allow more than 75 percent to be protected from garnishment and the rest have an absolute minimum level of weekly
earnings that are protected from garnishment.
11household size in the US was then used to arrive at an average estimate for reasonable living
expenses. Normalizing this estimate by average household income gives a value of 0:6103. The
value of cmin was set such that the ratio of cmin to average earnings in the model is 0:6103. Thus,
roughly speaking, if a person's earnings are less than 60 percent of mean income, he will not be
obligated to make any payments on his defaulted debt. The values of b and g were set to 0.1
and .143 respectively, so that a record of bankruptcy remains on a credit history on average for 10
years and a record of garnishment on average for 7 years.
This leaves four parameters, ;;b and g; which are set so as to make model moments come
close to relevant data moments.19 These data moments are (i) the fraction of hours worked, (ii) the
fraction of people in debt, (iii) the fraction of people ling for bankruptcy, (iv) the debt-to-output
ratio, and (v) the aggregate collection rate on defaulted debt. The last statistic is simply the ratio
of the amount paid each period on delinquent debt by people under garnishment to the total debt
defaulted upon each period. Data on the rst four statistics are easily available. Data on the fth
statistic (the aggregate collections ratio) are not. The target of 20 percent is an estimate by one
researcher familiar with the collections industry.20
Table 1 gives the values of the parameters and the data targets that determine these parameters
(for the four parameters that are jointly determined, the assignment is to the data target that
mostly determines that parameter). Since we are calibrating to the wage process from the PSID,
the earning inequality is not as high as in the data. This discrepancy presumably re
ects the fact
that the PSID does not provide accurate information on people with very high incomes. Although
the PSID earnings process is augmented with the super-rich state, the fraction of people earning
very high incomes is still very low so that the earnings Gini is well below what is observed in the
US data. But the addition of the super-rich state does help bring the model Gini on wealth close
to the data. The people who become super-rich have both the opportunity (very high incomes)
and the incentive (the state is very transitory) to accumulate large amounts of wealth. The model
is able to match the capital output ratio and the aggregate collections ratio fairly well but cannot
match the debt statistics exactly. The ling rate and the debt-to-output ratio are too low relative
19The model is solved using a collection of mostly standard techniques. The persistent and permanent components
of the eciency process are discretized using the recent Rouwenhorst method introduced by Kopecky and Suen
(2010). We use 3 permanent states and 5 persistent states. Conditional on having a permanent and persistent state,
the probability of having a particular level of eciency is calculated using Tauchen's (1986) method. The levels of
eciency (but not their probabilites) are chosen by discretizing the unconditional distribution using the Rouwenhorst
method. We use 5 levels of eciency (for a total of 75 states). The additional super-rich and/or super-poor state
is added as discussed in the main text. The household problem is solved using a grid search accelerated with policy
function iteration.
20We thank Robert Hunt of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Payment Cards Center for this estimate.
Hunt reports that according to ACA International, the average gross recovery rate on defaulted revolving debt in
2008 was 22 percent (the sample size is about 50 collection rms). From this amount the collection rm takes its cut
(about 30 percent) and returns the remainder to the company that placed the debt for collection. So the net recovery
rate to the owner of the debt is about 15 percent. Information from a large credit card lender indicates that the gross
recovery rate is typically 20 percent and the net recovery rate is typically 12-14 percent. Our model abstracts from
transactions costs, so we target the gross gure of 20 percent in our calibration.
12to the data and the fraction of population in debt too high. To get more debt into the model, the
interest rates on debt must fall but that increases the fraction in debt further above target and
tends to push the ling rate further below target.21 The existing conguration is about the best
the model can do. The average interest rate paid by borrowers is 22 percent and the debt-weighted
average is 35 percent.22
[Insert Table 1 here]
A novel feature of our model is the choice between bankruptcy and garnishment. In the bottom
section of Table 1 some statistics relevant to this choice are reported. In equilibrium, both options
are active, with the fraction defaulting and going into garnishment being 0:42 percent each period
(as compared to 0:29 percent for bankruptcy). The total stock of people with impaired credit (with
either a bankruptcy or a garnishment \
ag" in their credit history) is 5:2 percent, with a majority
having a garnishment 
ag.23 Although the fraction ling for bankruptcy is only 34 percent of
the total number of people defaulting, the fraction of debt that is written o in bankruptcy is 72
percent of total defaulted debt. This is intuitive: Bankruptcy is not the optimal choice when the
individual wishes to default on a low level of debt because both the 
ow cost and the duration of
punishment are higher for bankruptcy than for garnishment. Consistent with this logic, the average
income of debtors ling under bankruptcy is higher than the average income of debtors defaulting
into garnishment (0:16 vs 0:13). Because the debt that goes into garnishment is relatively small,
garnishment generally does not last long: On average a person is under garnishment for 4 years.
Most garnishments end in full repayment of debt, with only 1:2 percent of debtors being garnished
moving into bankruptcy each period.24 The population in debt and being garnished is 1:67 percent.
In the data, this number is between 1:5 and 1:7 percent, which is a remarkably good t.25 Finally,
the model predicts a much higher charge-o rate than what is observed in the data. In the data,
the average gross charge-o rate between 1984 and 2007 is 4:81 percent. The comparable statistic
21The diculty in matching the debt-to-income ratio, the ling rate and percentage in debt seems to be common
to this class of models (see, for instance, Athreya, Tam and Young, 2009, and Chatterjee et al., 2007).
22These numbers seem high relative to reported interest rates. However, lenders often disguise interest charges
as fees of various sorts. For instance, if a borrower is paying 18 percent interest on a credit balance of $500 and is
charged late fees of $35 twice, the eective annual interest rate is close to 32 percent.
23Since garnishment information appears in people's credit history for some length of time, it should be possible
to determine what fraction of people are carrying a garnishment 
ag. Unfortunately, given the aggregated form in
which credit bureau data are made available to researchers, it is not possible to determine this fraction.
24The probability of ling increases over time for people in garnishment: If a person under garnishment does not
exit garnishment, it is because his circumstances have either remained unchanged or deteriorated further. Further
deterioration in earnings may trigger a bankruptcy ling.
25The gures are from PSID for 1997, 2002 and 2007. In these years, the survey asked (with minor variations) the
following question: Have you had your wages attached or garnished by a creditor in the last 12 months? The percent
is the number of respondents who answered yes to the question. It is possible that respondents may have answered
no to this question if they made payments to creditors on the threat of garnishment, rather than actual garnishment.
To the extent this is true, these gures underestimate the fraction of people under garnishment each period in the
sense meant in the model. Also, the phrasing of the question seems to refer to any type of garnishment including
those arising from back taxes, child support payments and other judgments. Since non-dischargeable debt is not
considered in this paper, these gures are upper bounds on the model-relevant fraction of people being garnished.
13in the model is 19:23 percent. This deviation is to be expected given the fact that we have too
little debt in the model but the ling rate is about right.
Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) empirically examine the determinants of the frequency of Chapter
7 bankruptcy lings across US states. Among other ndings, they report that states that mandate
a higher threshold and protect a larger fraction of earnings above the threshold (restricted garnish-
ment states) experience fewer Chapter 7 lings (Table 3, p. 381). This prediction is checked against
the model by confronting two small (more precisely, measure zero) subsets of the model population
with alternative garnishment laws: a less-restricted garnishment law in which cmin is set to 0:1 times
average earnings and 
 = 0:25 (no state can have 
 higher than 0.25) and a more-restricted law in
which cmin is set to 0:61 times average earnings and 
 = 0:10. The long-run ling frequency is 0:25
for the less restricted garnishment law and 0:22 for the more restricted law. Correspondingly, the
frequency of garnishment is 0:13 in the former and 0:51 in the latter. Thus, ling frequencies move
in the direction consistent with the evidence, although the movement appears to be more muted
in the model than in the data.26
4 Eliminating Bankruptcy Protection
This section reports how prices, allocations and welfare are aected if bankruptcy protection (the
right to the discharge of debt) is eliminated. Indebted households may still default but creditors
have the right to collect on their claims to the extent permitted by wage garnishment laws.
4.1 Allocations and Prices
Table 2 compares the baseline steady state with the garnishment-only steady state. In the garnish-
ment economy, all parameters that are common between the baseline and garnishment economies
are set to the values determined for the bankruptcy economy.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Comparison reveals some similarities and also some very striking dierences. First, the average
labor supply in the two steady states are basically the same { actually, aggregate labor supply is
slightly lower in the garnishment economy. There are two reasons for this. First, labor supply is
lower because wages are lower (as we will see below). Second, garnishment distorts eort choices
downward because of the \tax" element. However, these eects do not amount to much because
the elasticity of labor supply is low and an individual will leave himself the possibility of being
26This may be due to the fact that the model does not contain a third category of borrowers: the class of \informal
bankrupts," who have stopped servicing their debts but are not pursued by their creditors because it is costly to do
so. Movements in and out of this category could account for the more pronounced eects of dierences in garnishment
laws (Dawsey and Ausubel, 2004 and Dawsey, Hynes and Ausubel, 2004). Furthermore, state variation in Chapter 7
ling rates may also result from state dierences in Chapter 7 homestead exemptions. This is the explanation put
forward in Mitman (2011) in the context of a quantitative-theoretic model that distinguishes between housing and
non-housing wealth; Li and White (2009) make a similar point in the context of regression analysis.
14garnished only if it's not that distortive for him (either because the individual earns less than
cmin or he can pay o the debt quickly). Because labor supply is not that much aected by the
garnishment regime, the earnings Gini remains essentially the same.
The most striking dierence between the two equilibria is in the debt measures. In the baseline
economy the percentage in debt is a little under 5 percent, but in the garnishment economy it is
a little under 30 percent { an increase of a factor of 6. Additionally, the debt-to-output ratio goes
from 0.09 percent to around 22 percent. The proximate reason for this huge expansion in credit is
a shift up of the q(a;s;p) schedule, stemming from a decline in the probability of default.27 The
lower interest rates motivate people to borrow more and the expansion in debt continues until the
default rate reaches roughly the same level as in the baseline economy. Importantly, the elimination
of discharge does not reduce the default { in fact, it increases it.
Even though the default rate is only somewhat above the baseline economy, the fraction of
people with impaired credit (i.e., in bad standing) is much higher. The reason is that the duration
of garnishment lasts much longer now because when people default they do so on much larger levels
of debt and it takes longer to repay those debts and exit garnishment.
The increase in consumer credit can be expected to crowd out xed capital, and it does, but
surprisingly little. The capital to output ratio declines from 3.08 to 2.97. The drop results in a
slightly higher risk-free interest rate, which rises from 1.74 percent to 2.05 percent, a rise of about
30 basis points. The decrease in capital per worker results in a decline in wages of 1.67 percent. The
decline in capital stock is muted because of the presence of the super-rich. These individuals have a
very elastic supply of savings and expand their savings to accommodate the increased demand for
consumer loans. If we eliminate the super-rich along with discharge, the capital output ratio falls
to 2:71 and the (net) rental return on capital climbs to 3:29 percent. Thus, getting the baseline
wealth distribution to match reality (which necessitated the addition of the super-rich state) has
important implications for the counterfactual.
Finally, Table 2 shows that there is a massive increase in wealth inequality. This comes about
because so many individuals become indebted. The top 5 percent of the population ends up
holding 66 percent of total wealth in the garnishment-only economy compared with 56 percent in
the baseline economy. The bottom quintile has negative net-worth amounting to 7 percent of total
wealth.
Why exactly does the incentive to default change so drastically in the garnishment economy?
There are two eects at work. One is the stick eect, which is that default is more costly to
the individual, and the other is the carrot eect, which is that maintaining access to markets is
27Athreya (2008, Table 1 p. 762) reports what happens if default is eliminated, so individuals can borrow at the
risk-free rate up to their natural borrowing limit. Although the calibration of his model is quite dierent from ours
and he keeps the risk-free interest rate constant, it is interesting to compare his ndings to ours. Athreya nds that if
default is eliminated, the fraction of indebted households rises to almost 40 percent and the aggregate debt to output
ratio rises to 39 percent. The latter increase is almost twice what we nd in our paper. The dierence in results
highlights our contention that what exactly replaces the bankruptcy option matters for the outcome.
15more benecial. Figure 1 shows that both eects are at work. The mostly 
at dashed line with
circles shows for a typical eciency level the value function of defaulting in the baseline economy,
which is the maximum of declaring bankruptcy and entering garnishment. The 
at region is where
bankruptcy is the best option. The dashed line without circles is the value of defaulting in the
garnishment-only economy. Observe that as the debt level rises, default in the garnishment-only
economy becomes increasingly worse relative to the value of default in the baseline. This is the
stick eect of garnishment: default under garnishment is simply not as benecial to the individual
as default under bankruptcy. The solid line with and the solid line without circles show the value
function conditional on repaying debt in the baseline and garnishment-only economies respectively.
Notice that the value of repaying debt in the garnishment-only economy lies considerably above
the value of repaying debt in the baseline. This is the carrot eect of garnishment: by lowering
the costs of borrowing, the garnishment-only economy increases the value of maintaining access
to the credit market. The lens-shaped areas trapped between the solid and dashed lines is where
households do not default. This area is much larger in the garnishment-only economy because of
these two eects.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The increased value of maintaining access to the credit market is apparent in the positioning of
the price schedules in the baseline and the garnishment-only economies. Figure 2 shows the average
loan price for the two economies for dierent levels of debt: credit is available under more generous
terms in the garnishment-only economy than in the baseline economy. Competitive lenders are
willing to extend loans on more generous terms because debtors do not default as much, and even
when they do default, they pay their debts back in due course.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Is the large increase in wealth inequality a credible implication of the lack of discharge? A
case in point is Sweden, which until 2005 did not permit discharge of debt and, yet, Sweden does
not have the wealth inequality predicted by our model. But Sweden's income process is dierent
as well. Table 3 reports wealth distribution statistics if the US garnishment-only economy is fed
Sweden's income process, also estimated and presented in Floden and Linde (2001).28 All other
parameters are exactly as in the US economy, except for , which is set to a value for which the
highest paid person in Sweden works twice as long as the lowest paid person. The table also
reports the wealth distribution statistics for Sweden taken from Domeij and Klein (1998). As
is evident, the wealth distribution for our \Swedish" economy is surprisingly close to the actual
Swedish wealth distribution. In particular, the bottom 20 percent of the population, on aggregate,
holds debt (as opposed to assets) in both the model economy as well as in the data. Indeed, the
level of indebtedness in the Swedish data is actually higher than in our \Swedish" model.29 This
28The AR1 coecient on the persistent process is 0.8139 and the variance of the innovation to this process is 0:0326;
the variance of the permanent shock is 0.0467 and the variance of the transitory shock is 0.0251.
29We should note that there are competing explanations for the large fraction of negative net-worth individuals in
16limited exercise indicates that the \extreme" distributional implications of the US garnishment-
only economy may re
ect the much greater degree of income risk in the US compared to European
economies. Also, if Sweden were to adopt US-style discharge laws, then, as shown in the nal
column, the bottom quintile will become net savers; the capital output ratio will rise; and the
distribution of wealth would look less unequal.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2 Welfare
The welfare eects of eliminating bankruptcy protection are now presented. The rst measure gives
the 
ow consumption a person would give up to go from a regime in which there is bankruptcy to
a regime in which bankruptcy is eliminated.30 The second measure simply counts the fraction of
people who would be in favor of eliminating bankruptcy. The latter measure provides insight into
the degree of political support in favor of or against the institution of bankruptcy.
In both cases, it is assumed that the question is posed in an unanticipated manner after people
have made their default decision but before they have chosen their new asset positions. This timing
ensures that the contemplated switch in regime does not impose unanticipated prots or losses on
the intermediary sector.31
The top panel of Table 4 reports the consumption equivalent measure from eliminating bankruptcy,
taking into account the transition to the new steady state. Each cell gives the consumption 
ow av-
eraged across the cell's households. Overall, there is a signicant gain from eliminating bankruptcy
{ amounting to about 1:0 percent of consumption in perpetuity. The gain is not uniform: Indebted
people gain more than others. This makes sense because borrowing is cheaper in the garnishment-
only economy. The income level matters as well: those receiving the lowest persistent or transitory
eciency shocks gain the most and those receiving the highest shocks the least. This pattern re-

ects the fact that those in need of loans are the ones who gain most from the decrease in borrowing
rates. For the permanent shock, the pattern of relative gain is reversed: those with the highest
permanent shock gain more than those with the lowest permanent shock. The high permanent
shock individuals own a large amount of assets and they prefer the garnishment because of the
higher associated interest rate on savings.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Sweden. Domeij and Klein (2002) argue that it is the nature of the Swedish public pension system that accounts for
Sweden's considerable wealth inequality despite Sweden having a relatively low earnings inequality.
30The consumption equivalent measure is computed as follows: Given policies c(a;e;h);n(a;e;h); and d(a;e;h)
corresponding to a value function V (a;e;h), the value of using policies ~ c(a;e;h) = (1 +  )c(a;e;h), n(a;e;h); and
d(a;e;h) forever is computed using policy iteration. This is done for 30 values of   between -0.9 and 2. To nd the  
for which ~ V (a;e;h; ) equals some level of utility W, a nonlinear equation solver (interpolating ~ V in the   dimension)
is used.
31We start with the steady state bankruptcy distribution in period 0. Then, all households that le for bankruptcy
are transitioned to 0 assets and given a garnishment 
ag. Next, households make their c;n and a
0 choices conditional
on there being no bankruptcy option going forward.
17The bottom panel of the table reports the fraction of people in each cell in favor of eliminating
bankruptcy protection. About 10 percent of the population opposes it and, interestingly, they
are drawn mostly from the ranks of indebted people with high persistent and transitory eciency
shocks. Why do these people oppose the elimination of discharge? Because they have high income
which they expect to mean revert, their need to borrow is low, and because they are indebted, they
are unlikely to have a high level of assets. For these individuals the main eect on welfare comes
from the decline in real wages. The eect is small (because the decline in wages is small) but they
oppose the change, nevertheless.
Although factor prices do not change very much from one steady state to the other, Table 5
indicates that the steady-state welfare gains are about 0.2 percentage point, or less, lower than those
taking the transition into account. Also, ignoring the transition can give a misleading picture of
the degree of political support for the elimination of bankruptcy. Without the added benet of the
higher consumption aorded by the de-accumulation of capital, support for elimination of discharge
is much lower. Overall, only 67 percent of the population now favors eliminating discharge.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Garnishment increases the value of maintaining access to credit markets and allows for an
expansion of credit. It is useful to understand exactly what this expansion allows in terms of
consumption proles. With this in mind, a large number of individuals were simulated who \start
life" with a = 0, h = 0 and e drawn from the invariant distribution. Their consumption and asset
holdings were recorded for the next 80 periods (years) under both the bankruptcy steady state and
the garnishment steady state. The following two gures display average consumption and average
asset holdings across the two regimes for each of the 80 periods.
Figure 3 shows that mean asset holdings rise more slowly in the garnishment-only economy,
whereas they increase rapidly in the bankruptcy economy. In the latter, the high cost of loans
forces individuals to accumulate assets in order to self-insure. In the garnishment economy, the
need to accumulate precautionary savings is much less urgent, since the loan supply schedule is
much more attractive. Mean consumption is higher in the garnishment economy because people are
saving less. Mean consumption is higher for some time until the accumulated debt burden begins
to lower consumption below that in the baseline economy.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The eects of better consumption smoothing can be seen in Figure 4, which displays the co-
ecient of variation of consumption for each age. Observe that the coecient of variation is
initially lower in the garnishment-only economy but then exceeds that of the baseline economy.
It is lower initially because of the superior consumption smoothing aorded by the generous loan
supply schedules in the garnishment-only economy. But the other side of the same coin is the in-
creased dispersion of asset holdings resulting from enhanced borrowing and lending. Higher wealth
inequality eventually translates into higher consumption inequality.
18[Insert Figure 4 here]
Finally, the optimal garnishment regime, if discharge were to be eliminated, is investigated.
This exercise is motivated by the consideration that elimination of discharge is a large institu-
tional change that, if it were to be instituted, would almost surely result in signicant changes in
garnishment law as well. The average steady-state consumption gains for a range of cmin and 

values were computed.32 The optimal garnishment regime is one with 
 = 1 and cmin = 0. This
is a \zero tolerance for delinquency" regime in which the creditors have the right to garnish all
of the debtor's earnings in case of default. Eliminating discharge and instituting this garnishment
regime raises average steady-state welfare by 3:71 percent as compared to 0:856 percent for the
current garnishment regime. The optimal garnishment economy is essentially a \natural borrowing
limit" (a la Aiyagari, 1994) economy with no default. There is no voluntary default because the
creditors can garnish earnings fully to recover the defaulted debt so the defaulter does not gain
current consumption but pays the reputation costs associated with a bad credit history. And there
is no involuntary default because individuals never nd it in their interest to borrow more than
the amount that can be rolled over even in the event the debtor has the lowest eciency level. For
the baseline calibration, this natural borrowing limit is  1:58, or roughly 360 percent larger than
average income in the economy. In contrast, the maximum amount that an individual would wish
to borrow in the current garnishment regime (with no discharge) is  0:93, or roughly 210 percent
larger than average income in the economy.33
This logic makes clear that the optimality of the \zero tolerance" regime hinges on the size of
the lowest eciency level.34 If this level is very low { \a disaster state" { the optimal garnishment
economy will not be the \zero tolerance" one. This point is veried by augmenting the income
process with an eciency level that corresponds to a super-poor state, which happens with a very
small probability and is very transitory.35 Addition of this state does not change model statistics in
the baseline economy because the probability of the super-poor state is very low and the individual
debtor always has the option to declare bankruptcy.36 However, once bankruptcy protection is
eliminated, the event looms large in the utility calculation of individuals. Basically, the presence of
this state raises the welfare gain from elimination of discharge for low punishment regimes and lowers
it for high punishment regimes. For instance, the welfare gain for the current regime rises from
0:841 percent to 0:917 percent and that for the \zero tolerance" regime declines from 3:710 percent
32We ignored the transition because it is time consuming to compute.
33The most that a lender would wish to borrow is the debt level at which q(a
0;s)a
0 is maximized. Although the
individual can borrow more than this, he would not want to because the borrower gets less in terms of current
consumption and is saddled with more debt in the future.
34In the discretized income process of the baseline economy, the minimum eciency level is a positive number
although the true distribution allows for eciency levels arbitrarily close to zero with vanishingly small probability.
35The eciency level is 5 standard deviations below the unconditional mean of the log-eciency process. It is iid
and occurs with a probability of 1 in 3.5 million (which is the mass 5 standard deviations or more below the mean of
a normal distribution).
36For example, both the population in debt and the population ling for bankruptcy are unchanged. The capital-
output ratio declines slightly to 3.03 (from 3.07).
19to 2:076 percent. Furthermore, the \zero tolerance " regime is no longer optimal; the optimal
regime now has 
 = 0:50 and cmin = 0. These results are indicative of how the welfare results
would change if wealth/liability shocks had been included in the model. As noted in Chatterjee et
al. (2007) and in Livshits et al. (2007), wealth shocks stemming from uninsured medical expenses
are an important trigger for bankruptcy. Including such shocks will likely reduce the welfare gain
from elimination of discharge. In this sense, our welfare estimates should be viewed as an upper
bound.
5 Conclusion
It is useful to conclude by putting the ndings of this project into perspective and drawing some
lessons regarding important future research lines in the area of consumer default.
A question one might ask is whether the ndings reported in this paper rmly support the
notion that the US economy would be better o without bankruptcy protection. Although a 1
percent increase in welfare is large by the standards of macroeconomic analysis, this gain must
be set against costs ignored in this study. One cost that has been ignored is the cost of enforcing
garnishment laws. In the baseline economy, less than 2 percent of the population suer garnishment
each period; in the counterfactual, close to 16 percent do. To process such a large volume of
garnishments, the administrative and legal resources devoted to this task must be increased very
substantially. Second, a society with as extreme a wealth distribution as the garnishment-only
economy would presumably suer from political and social costs. These missing costs suggest that
the ndings reported in this paper do not provide a convincing case for elimination of bankruptcy
protection, at least given current garnishment laws.
This, then, raises the question of whether default policy should move in the direction of elim-
inating bankruptcy protection and toughening up garnishment laws. A strong commitment to
honor one's debt works well if it is combined with forward-looking behavior that steers individuals
away from truly bad nancial situations. But the train of events of the last several years shows
that individuals may not possess the requisite foresight to pull this o. After decades of low ag-
gregate volatility, the Great Contraction caught people and policymakers by surprise. The design
of legal institutions that can facilitate the optimal societal response to unexpected situations re-
mains an open and important task. In this quest, historical experience can serve as a guide: In
the pre-discharge era, state legislatures granted delinquent debtors one-time debt forgiveness when
macroeconomic conditions were particularly bad. Estimating the net benets of tough garnishment
laws coupled with state-contingent bankruptcy protection would seem to be a useful line of research.
Another question one might ask is what lessons do quantitative-theoretic models oer for con-
ventional empirical research on consumer default? Empirical studies (well-known examples are Fay,
Hurst and White (2002) and Gross and Souleles (2002)) focus on testing the sign restrictions on
regression coecients implied by simple models of default. Quantitative-theoretic models go be-
20yond simple default models in making predictions regarding the magnitude of the various eects as
well. This added quantitative information can be useful in interpreting empirical ndings, in terms
of the importance of the various causal mechanisms at work. A case in point is the muted eect of
variation in garnishment restrictions (all else remaining the same) on bankruptcy ling rates in the
model. As noted earlier, this dierence may arise from the presence of real world features missing in
the model such as informal bankruptcy and the eects of state variations in Chapter 7 homestead
exemptions. Furthermore, the fact that quantitative-theoretic models are fully articulated articial
economies composed of heterogeneous agents operating through time can be leveraged to generate
articial data of the type available to empirical researchers and which can then be approached in
the same way that researchers approach real data. This procedure can illuminate the strengths and
weaknesses of empirical specications in uncovering causal links that researchers believe exist in
reality { and which exist for sure in the model-generated data { but can get distorted, or masked,
by data limitations (Chen, 2010).
Aside from enriching the interplay between theory and empirics, quantitative-theoretic models
may alert empirical researchers to regularities that should exist in the data, if the underlying theory
is correct. One example of this is the prediction that the costs of garnishment ought to be lower
than the costs of bankruptcy and that debts collected in garnishment should be smaller, on average,
than debts written o in bankruptcy. The feedback can also go the other way: Fay, Hurst and
White's nding that many individuals forgo bankruptcy even when it is nancially benecial has
motivated quantitative theorists to include the heterogeneous non-pecuniary costs of bankruptcy
lings (Athreya, Tam and Young, 2009).
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23A Extended Model Description
Let A  R denote the set of asset positions. In the theory as well as in the computation, A is
taken to be a nite set, which includes 0 and positive and negative elements. A   is the set of
strictly negative elements and A+ the set of non-negative elements. Denote the sequence of current
and future factor prices by p = fwt+j;rt+jg1
j=0. Let w(p) and r(p) denote the current wage and






j = rt+1+j, j = 0;1;2;:::;1.
In addition to the individual states a, e, and s, there is a state variable h 2 f0;1;2g that takes
on the value 1 if the person has a record of a past bankruptcy ling; the value 2 if the person is
currently under garnishment (i.e., has some unpaid debt obligation) or if the person has satised
the garnishment but the record of the garnishment has not yet been removed from the person's
credit history; the value 0 if there is no record of any ling or garnishment in the person's credit
history. We will denote the optimal lifetime utility of a person in state (a;e;s;h) by V (a;e;s;h;p).
We index the value functions (and decision rules) by p to emphasize the fact that the value of these
objects depends on the current and future trajectory of factor prices.
A.1 Decision Problem of People
A person can be in one of ve situations:
1. a < 0 and h = 0. In this case, the person has three options: he can repay his debt; he can
default on his debt and subject himself to garnishment; or he can le for bankruptcy. The
value from repayment, which we denote as V R(a;e;s;h = 0;p), is given by the following
dynamic program:
V R(a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p) = max
a02A;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)jsV (a0;e0;s0;h = 0;p0)
s.t.
c = w(p)en + a   Ifa0<0gq(a0;s;p)a0   Ifa00g q(p)a0
p0 = B(p);
where Ifg denotes an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the expression in fg is
true and 0 otherwise.
The value from default and garnishment, which we denote by V G(a;e;s;h;p), is given by the
24following dynamic program
V G(a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p) =
max
a02A;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)js[Ifa0<0gV G(a0;e0;s0;h = 2;p0)+
Ifa00gV (a0;e0;s0;h = 2;p0)]
s.t.
a0   a  minfmaxf0;
(w(p)en   cmin)g; ag
c = w(p)en   [a0   a]Ifa0<0g   Ifa00g[ q(p)a0   a]
p0 = B(p):
The value from bankruptcy, which we denote by V B(a;e;s;h;p), is given by the following
dynamic program:
V B(a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p) = max
a02A;n2[0;1];c0




The person chooses the best of these options. Therefore, in this case,
V (a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p) =
maxfV R(a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p);V G(a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p);V B(a < 0;e;s;h = 0;p)g
2. a < 0 and h = 2. This is the case where the person defaulted in some previous period, hasn't
paid o his obligations and is under garnishment. This person can exit garnishment by ling
for bankruptcy or he can continue on in garnishment. The value from doing the former is
given by
V B(a < 0;e;s;h = 2;p) = max
a02A;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)jsV (0;e0;s0;h = 1;p0)]
s.t.
c = (1   g)w(p)en
p0 = B(p):
25The value of doing the latter is given by:
V G(a < 0;e;s;h = 2;p) =
max
a02A;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)js[Ifa0<0gV G(a0;e0;s0;h = 2;p0)+
Ifa00gV (a0;e0;s0;h = 2;p0)]
s.t.
a0   a  minfmaxf0;
(w(p)en   cmin)g; ag
c = [1   g]w(p)en   [a0   a]Ifa0<0g   Ifa00g[ q(p)a0   a]
p0 = B(p):
The person chooses the best option, so, in this case
V (a < 0;e;s;h = 2;p) = maxfV G(a < 0;e;s;h = 2;p);V B(a < 0;e;s;h = 2;p)g:
3. a  0 and h = 2. This is the case where the person was in garnishment in the past but the
garnishment 
ag has not yet been removed.
V (a  0;e;s;h = 2;p) =
max
a02A+;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)js[(1   g)V (a0;e0;s0;h = 2;p0)+
gV (a0;e0;s0;h = 0;p0)]
s.t.
c = [1   g]w(p)en    q(p)a0 + a
p0 = B(p):
4. a  0 and h = 1. This is the case where the person led for bankruptcy in the past and the
bankruptcy 
ag has not yet been removed.
V (a  0;e;s;h = 1;p) =
max
a02A+;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)js[(1   b)V (a0;e0;s0;h = 1;p0)+
bV (a0;e0;s0;h = 0;p0)]
s.t.
c = [1   b]w(p)en    q(p)a0 + a
p0 = B(p):
5. a  0, h = 0. In this case, the person has no outstanding obligations and no record of past
26default.
V (a  0;e;s;h = 0;p) = max
a02A;n2[0;1];c0
u(c;n;e) + E(s0;e0)jsV (a0;e0;s0;h = 0;p0)
s.t.
c = w(p)en + a   Ifa0<0gq(a0;s;p)a0   Ifa00g q(p)a0
p0 = B(p):
The solution to this individual problem implies decision rules a0(a;e;s;h;p), n(a;e;s;h;p) and
c(a;e;s;h;p). In addition, for a < 0 and h 2 f0; 2g the solution also implies a bankruptcy decision
rule b(a;e;s;h;p) which takes the value of 1 if the person les for bankruptcy and zero otherwise,
and a garnishment decision rule g(a;e;s;h;p) that takes the value 1 if the person defaults (or
continues in default) and subjects himself to garnishment, and 0 otherwise.
A.2 Decision Problem of the Representative Firm
The representative rm's optimization problem is static: it rents K and hires N each period to




F(K;N)   w(p)N   r(p)K
A.3 Decision Problem of the Intermediary Sector
As noted earlier, intermediaries are the counterparty to every borrowing and lending contract
entered into by consumers and are also the owners of capital stock in this economy. We will assume
that there is one representative intermediary who takes prices as given and chooses (i) how much
capital to purchase in the current period (for use in the following period), (ii) how many new
borrowing or lending contracts of dierent types to enter into with consumers, and (iii) if there is
a market for defaulted debt, how much of each dierent types of defaulted debt to purchase.
The net return from the rst activity (purchase of capital) is:
 K0 +
(1   ) + r(B(p))
1 + i(p)
K0 (4)
Let m0(y;s;p) be the measure of newly issued contracts of type (y;s;p) held by the intermediary
sector at the end of the current period. Let (y;s;p) be the fraction of borrowers who default
(i.e., either le for bankruptcy or enter into garnishment) conditional on taking out a (new) loan
of size y and having current persistent eciency level s. And, conditional on there being a default,
let qD(y;s;p) be the expected (per unit) value of the defaulted debt. We will refer to this as the
27expected recovery rate. Then, the net return from the second activity (purchase of newly issued





















Let z0(y;s;p) be the measure of defaulted debt of type (y < 0;s;p) held by the intermediary sector.
Let (~ a;y;s0;p) be the fraction of delinquent debtors who do not le for bankruptcy and choose
y  ~ a next period, given an unpaid debt of y, a persistent eciency level of s0 and next period's




















Let M0 denote the distribution of newly issued contracts held by the intermediary sector and Z0
the distribution of defaulted debt held by the intermediary sector.
The decision problem is to choose K0;M0;Z0 to maximize the sum of (4), (5) and (6).
A.4 Equilibrium
We focus on perfect foresight equilibrium. Let (a;e;s;h) denote the distribution of people over the
individual states. Let  (;p) describe the law of motion of this distribution. That is, 0(a;e;s;h) =
 ((a;e;s;h);p) is the distribution of people of individual states next period, given the current
distribution  and current and future sequence of factor prices p. The time evolution of the
distribution is then given by the recursion t+1(a;e;s;h) =  (t;Bt(p)), where it is understood
that 0 = , B0(p) = p and Bt(p) is dened by the recursion Bt(p) = B(Bt 1(p)).
A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium for an initial distribution of people over individual
states (a;e;s;h) and an initial aggregate capital K is (i) a sequence of current and future factor
prices p, (ii) a set of credit market prices q(a < 0;s;p),  q(p), x(y < 0;s;p) and i(p), (iii) a set of in-
dividual decision rules a0(a;e;s;h;p), n(a;e;s;h;p), c(a;e;s;h;p);b(a;e;s;h;p) and g(a;e;s;h;p),
(iv) a set of production sector decision rules K(p) and N(p), (v) a set of intermediary sector
decision rules K0(p), m0(y;s;p) and z0(y;s;p) and (vi) a law of motion  (;p) such that:
1. The decision rules solve the individual dynamic optimization problem, given p and credit
market prices q(y;s;p) and  q(p).
2. K(p) and N(p) solve the production sector static optimization problem.
283. K0(p), m0(y;s;p) and z0(y;s;p) solve the intermediary optimization problem.
4. The goods market clears:




c(a;e;s;h;p) + (Ifh=1gb + Ifh=2gg)w(p)en(a;e;s;h;p)

(a;e;s;h): (7)





6. The market for physical capital clears:
K(p) = K:
7. The credit market for newly issued debt clears:




Ifa0(a;e;s;h=0;p)=yg(a;e;s;h = 0): (8)
8. The market for defaulted debt clears:






Ifg(a;e;s;h;p)=1 and a0(a;e;s;h;p)=yg(a;e;s;h): (9)
9. The probabilities (y;s;p) and (a0;a;e;s;p) and the price qD(y;s;p)) that appear in the
intermediary sector's decision problem must be consistent with individual decision rules and



















minfa0(y;e0;s0;h0 = 0;B(p))   y; yg
 y
+ x(a0(y;e0;s0;h = 0;B(p));s0;B(p))

29In the expression for qD, if for some y g(y;e0;s0;h = 0;B(p)) = 0 and b(y;e0;s0;h = 0;B(p)) =
0 for all (e0;s0), the expectation term on the right-hand side becomes indeterminate (i.e.,
evaluates to 0=0). In this case, the recovery rate in default is irrelevant and we set the
expectation to 1.
10. The law of motion for  is consistent with individual decision rules. This requirement is
easiest to describe in three parts.












Ifa0(a;e;s;h=2;p)=~ agg(a;e;s;h = 2)~ sjs~ s(~ e); (13)












Ifa0(a;e;s;h=1;p)=~ ag(1   b)(a;e;s;h = 1)~ sjs~ s(~ e); (14)








Ifa0(a;e;s;h=1;p)=~ ag(1   g)(a;e;s;h = 2)~ sjs~ s(~ e); (15)
where G is the distribution over (a;e;s) from which newborns are drawn (all newborns start
with h = 0).
11. There is perfect foresight. That is, the sequence p is implied by the evolution of the economy
starting from K and (a;e;s;h). Formally, this requires that for any t  1 conditions (1)-(9)
are satised for K = K0t 1(p)) and (a;e;s;h) = t(a;e;s;h), where t satises the recursion
t(a;e;s;h) =  (t 1;Bt 1(p)), with 0 = (a;e;s;h) and B0(p) = p.
The factor market clearing conditions and the two credit market clearing conditions impose
restrictions on factor prices and on the price of loans and deposits which are used in computing the
30equilibrium of the model. If there is positive production in each period, then
r(p) = FK(K(p);N(p)) and w(p) = FN(K(p);N(p)):
If the intermediary sector holds a positive quantity of capital each period, prot maximization
requires that the net return from holding capital is exactly zero. From (4), this implies:
i(p) = r(B(p))   :
If the intermediary sector holds positive amounts of deposits or loans of a given type, then the net









(1   (y;s;p) + (y;s;p)qD(y;s;p)

: (17)
Finally, in the garnishment regime, if the intermediary sector holds positive amounts of defaulted













The model is solved using a collection of mostly standard techniques. The persistent and perma-
nent components of the eciency process are discretized using the recent Rouwenhorst method
introduced by Kopecky and Suen (2010). We use 3 permanent states and 5 persistent states. Con-
ditional on having a permanent and persistent state, the probability of having a particular level of
eciency is calculated using Tauchen's (1986) method. The levels of eciency (but not their prob-
abilites) are chosen by discretizing the unconditional distribution using the Rouwenhorst method.
We use 5 levels of eciency (for a total of 75 states). The additional super-rich and/or super-poor
state is added as discussed in the main text. The household problem is solved using a grid search
accelerated with policy function iteration.
In making welfare comparisons, the presence of endogenous labor complicates obtaining the
consumption equivalent measure. In particular, there is no analytic formula for it. Instead, we
proceed in two steps. First, we obtain the welfare from having 
 more consumption in every state
of the world (holding xed the other policies) using policy iteration (denote this utility V (a;e;h;
)).
Second, we compute the value of 
 that equates V (a;e;h;
) with some comparison level of utility
31W. This 
 is the consumption equivalent measure. Given policies c(a;e;h);n(a;e;h); and d(a;e;h)
corresponding to a value function V (a;e;h), we construct a new consumption policy ~ c(a;e;h) =
(1 + 
)c(a;e;h) and compute the value of using ~ c;n; and d forever by using policy iteration. We
compute this for 30 values of 
 between -.9 and 2. Last, to nd the 
 for which ~ V (a;e;h;
) equals
some level of utility W, we use a nonlinear equation solver (interpolating ~ V in the 
 dimension).
32Table 1: Model Statistics and Parameter Values
Statistic Target Model Parameter Value
Targets determined independently
Average years of life 40 40  0.975
Coecient of risk aversion 2.0 2.0  2.000
Capital share of income 0.36 0.36  0.360
Depreciation rate of capital 0.10 0.10  0.100
Average years of exclusion following bankruptcy 10 10 b 0.100
Average years of exclusion following garnishment 7 7 g 0.143
Targets determined jointly
Average hours worked 0.33 0.33  4:3  105
Earnings Gini index 0.61 0.46
Wealth Gini index 0.80 0.83
Percentage of lers 0.29 0.22 b 0.01094
Percentage in debt 3.6 4.9  0.952
Capital-output ratio 3.08 3.07 Emax 731.7
Debt-output ratio  100 0.36 0.09
Aggregate Collection Ratio 0.20 0.24 g 0.00104
Other Statisitics
Annual debt-weighted average interest rate 35.50
Annual average interest rate 16.40
Wealth share of the top 5 percent 57.8 65.6
Wealth share of the 5th quintile 81.7 83.4
Wealth share of the 4th quintile 12.2 10.6
Wealth share of the 3rd quintile 5.0 4.4
Wealth share of the 2nd quintile 1.3 1.4
Wealth share of the 1st quintile -0.2 0.1
% of Population With Record of Bankruptcy 1.78
% of Population With Record of Garnishment 3.50
% of Population Defaulting into Garnishment 0.42
% of Population in Garnishment with Debt 1.49 1.67
Avg. Inc. in the Economy 0.44
Avg. Inc. of Debtors Filing for Bankruptcy 0.16
Avg. Inc. of Debtors Defaulting into Garnishment 0.13
Fraction under Garnishment Filing Bankruptcy .012
Defaulted Debt as % of Total Debt 4.81 19.23
Debts Discharged as % of Total Defaulted Debt 72
Note: The table lists some US statistics with the corresponding statistics in the model, as well
33as the parameter values that most closely aect the model statistics. Where the US statistic is
not known, its value is left blank. The parameters are as follows:  is a conditional probability
of survival,  is the coecient of relative risk aversion,  is the capital share of income,  is the
depreciation rate of capital, b and g are the probabilities that a record of bankruptcy respectively
garnishment is removed from an individual's credit history, b and g are the pecuniary costs of
bankruptcy respectively garnishment,  is part of the disutility cost of labor,  is the time discount
factor, and Emax is the eciency of the super-rich households (the average eciency in the economy
is normalized to one).
34Table 2: Comparison of Baseline and Garnishment-Only Economies
Statistic Baseline Garn. Only
Average hours worked 0.33 0.33
Earnings Gini index 0.46 0.46
Percentage in debt 4.89 29.69
Debt-output ratio as percentage 0.09 22.30
Percentage of defaulters 0.65 0.80
Percentage of people under garnishment with debt 1.67 16.31
Percentage of pop w/ impaired credit 5.28 18.27
Capital-output ratio 3.07 2.99
Wage per eciency unit 1.20 1.18
Rental rate on capital (MPK - ) in % 1.74 2.05
Annual debt-weighted average interest rate 35.50 21.60
Annual average interest rate 16.40 13.10
Wealth Gini index 0.83 1.00
Wealth share of the top 5 percent 65.6 76.0
Wealth share of the 5th quintile 83.4 94.3
Wealth share of the 4th quintile 10.6 10.0
Wealth share of the 3rd quintile 4.4 2.9
Wealth share of the 2nd quintile 1.4 -0.1
Wealth share of the 1st quintile 0.1 -7.0
Note: The table compares the baseline economy, where households can default by ling for
bankruptcy or by entering into garnishment, to the garnishment-only economy where the option of
ling for bankruptcy has been eliminated.
35Table 3: Wealth Distribution for Sweden: Data and Model
Garn. Garn.
Statistic Data Only & Bank.
Wealth Gini Index 0.79 0.69 0.57
Wealth share of the top 5 % 33 26 23
Wealth share of the 5th quintile 72 65 58
Wealth share of the 4th quintile 25 25 24
Wealth share of the 3rd quintile 9 11 12
Wealth share of the 2nd quintile 1 3 5
Wealth share of the 1st quintile -7 -5 1
Note: The table reports wealth statistics from Sweden's economy along with the comparable
statistics for two dierent model economies. First is the model economy where households do not
have an option to le for bankruptcy but may default by entering into garnishment. This framework
is closest to Swedish law. Second is the model economy where households may default by entering
into garnishment or by ling for bankruptcy.
36Table 4: Welfare Gains From Elimination of Bankruptcy
Average Consumption Gain
All Permanent Persistent Transitory
H L H L H L
All 1.1 1.4 0.8 0.5 5.8 0.3 3.8
In Debt 5.0 6.2 3.5 -0.0 10.2 0.1 8.8
No Debt 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.5 5.1 0.3 3.4
Population in Favor
All Permanent Persistent Transitory
H L H L H L
All 89.8 98.9 81.2 92.5 100 95.9 99.9
In Debt 98.4 99.4 98.2 5.1 100 89.7 100
No Debt 89.6 98.9 80.9 92.8 100 96.0 99.9
Note: The table reports welfare gains from eliminating bankruptcy conditional on dierent
samples of the population who have a good credit history taking into account the transition. The
welfare gains are measured in two ways. The rst measure is the \Average Consumption Gain." A
\consumption gain" is the percentage increase in lifetime consumption needed to make a household
indierent between staying in the baseline economy with the consumption increase and moving to
the garnishment-only economy. Averaging across a particular sample gives the average gain. The
second measure is the \Population in Favor" which is the percentage of people (in a sample) who
would benet from eliminating bankruptcy. The dierent samples considered are combinations
of indebted and non-indebted households with households having the highest \H" or lowest \L"
permanent, persistent, or transitory income shocks.
37Table 5: Steady State Welfare Gains From Elimination of Bankruptcy
Average Consumption Gain
All Permanent Persistent Transitory
H L H L H L
All 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.3 5.5 0.2 3.5
In Debt 4.5 5.8 3.1 -0.4 9.7 -0.3 8.3
No Debt 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.3 4.8 0.2 3.1
Population in Favor
All Permanent Persistent Transitory
H L H L H L
All 67.4 80.4 62.9 67.0 100 50.5 99.6
In Debt 91.4 88.2 94.8 0.0 100 2.4 100
No Debt 66.7 80.2 62.3 67.2 100 51.1 99.6
Note: The table reports welfare gains from eliminating bankruptcy conditional on dierent sam-
ples of the population who have a good credit history without taking into account the transition.
The \Average Consumption Gain" measures how much households value eliminating bankruptcy.
The \Population in Favor" measures how many households value it. \H" and \L" denote respec-
tively the highest and lowest realized shock values.
38Figure 1: Value Functions








Typical Value Function Comparisons










Value of Repaying, Baseline
Value of Defaulting, Baseline
Value of Repaying, Garnishment Only
Value of Defaulting, Garnishment Only
Note: The gure depicts typical value functions for two dierent choices in two dierent
economies. In the baseline economy, households have the option to default using bankruptcy or
garnishment. Hence their value of defaulting is the maximum of the value of declaring bankruptcy
and the value of being garnished. This is labeled \Value of Defaulting, Baseline." Similarly, \Value
of Repaying, Baseline" denotes the utility from not defaulting in the baseline economy. In the
garnishment-only economy where the bankruptcy option has been eliminated, \Value of Default-
ing, Garnishment Only" denotes the value of entering into garnishment and \Value of Repaying,
Garnishment Only" denotes the value of not defaulting.
39Figure 2: Loan Supply in the Baseline and Garnishment-Only Economies












Average Asset Price Schedules






























Note: The gure depicts the price schedules of the baseline and garnishment-only economies.
The further up and to the left the discount-bond price schedule is, the cheaper credit is. \Average"
price schedule here means the price schedule with the eciency level integrated out (using the
invariant distribution of eciency).
40Figure 3: Mean Consumption by \Age"























Note: The gure depicts the average level of consumption across a sample of 10 million house-
holds over 80 periods in the baseline and garnishment-only economies. Households are born (in
period 1) with zero asset holdings with a good credit history and a random realization of income
(drawn from the invariant distribution).
41Figure 4: Dispersion of Consumption by \Age"



















Note: The gure depicts the coecient of variation of consumption across a sample of 10
million households over 80 periods in the baseline and garnishment-only economies. Households
are born (in period 1) with zero asset holdings with a good credit history and a random realization
of income (drawn from the invariant distribution). The coecient of variation is the standard
deviation divided by the mean and is a unit-free measure of dispersion.
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